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Enacted in 1978, the Bankruptcy Code,1 under 11 U.S.C. § 363(k), 
permits the practice of credit bidding—the process through which a 
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secured creditor may offset the purchase price a creditor pays at auction 
by the face value of the lien securing the claim 2 —in sales under 
§ 363(b).3 However, judicial recognition of this right dates back as far as 
the 1930s.4 Even though the United States Supreme Court, in Wright v. 
Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, indicated that the right to 
credit bid was not absolute,5 section 363(k)—as originally enacted—did 
not appear to permit judicial discretion. 6  Despite absolute language 
regarding the right to credit bid under § 363(k), legal scholarship 
suggests that Congress did not intend to alter the right to credit bid, 
codifying the right only to the extent that it existed prior to 1978.7 
Whether or not the original § 363(k) altered credit bidding is of no 
consequence because Congress clarified the matter with the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.8 After amendment, 
§ 363(k) provided the bankruptcy courts with the express power to limit 
a creditor’s ability to credit bid “for cause.”9 
Despite providing courts with the discretion to limit credit bidding 
for cause, the number of instances where a bankruptcy court has 
exercised its power to abridge credit bidding has been exceedingly rare 
and almost invariably requires a showing of collusion or a bona fide 
																																																																																																																																
 1. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) 
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.). 
 2. Vincent Buccola & Ashley C. Keller, Credit Bidding and the Design of 
Bankruptcy Auctions, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 102-04 (2010) (providing an 
overview of credit bidding). 
 3. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (1978) (amended 1984). 
 4. See, e.g., Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 
(1937) (recognizing a creditor bundle of rights that includes the right to credit bid); 
Morgan v. Blieden, 107 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1939) (allowing a bidder to calculate bid in 
an amount including claim against assets); Miners Sav. Bank v. Joyce, 97 F.2d 973 (3d 
Cir. 1938) (finding the same). 
 5. Wright, 300 U.S. at 457. 
 6. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 363(k), 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (amended 1984). 
 7. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 363.09 (16th ed.) (“The right of a lienholder 
whose lien was not in bona fide dispute to bid at a sale free and clear of liens was 
generally recognized under prior law, and this right is continued by section 363(k).”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 8. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 442(g), 98 Stat. 333 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 363(k)). 
 9. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2012) (“At a sale under subsection (b) of this 
section of property that is subject to a lien that secures an allowed claim, unless the 
court for cause orders otherwise the holder of such claim may bid at such sale, and, if 
the holder of such claim purchases such property, such holder may offset such claim 
against the purchase price of such property.”). 
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dispute.10  In In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, the Third Circuit 
noted that under the language of § 363(k), a “court may deny a lender 
the right to credit bid in the interest of any policy advanced by the Code, 
such as to ensure the success of the reorganization or to foster a 
competitive bidding environment.” 11  This assertion advocates for an 
expanded view of judicial discretion with regard to for cause limitations 
to credit bidding; however, no bankruptcy court had used the “chilling 
effects” of credit bidding as the primary basis for limiting a credit bid 
until In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, LLC.12 
In Fisker, a January 2014 opinion, Judge Kevin Gross of the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware limited a secured 
creditor’s right to credit bid because a failure to do so would have 
effectively eliminated the possibility of a public auction.13 In doing so, 
Judge Gross cited to Philadelphia Newspapers as the authority 
permitting this limitation. 14  Should this interpretation of judicial 
discretion under § 363(k) gain favor, the practice of credit bidding in 
asset sales could be severely impacted.15 
Despite the expansive language of Fisker, practitioners have 
questioned what precedential value the opinion might have.16 Notably, 
Judge Gross himself may have intended to limit this holding to the facts 
of the case.17 Additionally, the facts leading up to this decision raised 
concerns about whether the liens had been properly perfected at all, 
which would ultimately determine whether the secured claim was even 
allowable.18 This dispute is significant because the language of § 363(k) 
only provides the right to credit bid allowed claims.19 In situations where 
																																																																																																																																
 10. Mark Wege, Ed Ripley & Aaron Power, Current Issues Involving Section 
363(k) Credit Bids, 6 PRATT J. BANKR. L., no. 1, 2010 at 13, 15-16. 
 11. 599 F.3d 298, 316 n.14 (2010) (citing 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 363.09[1] 
(16th ed.) (“The Court might [deny credit bidding] if permitting the lienholder to bid 
would chill the bidding process.”). 
 12. In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, L.L.C., No. 13–13087(KG), 2014 WL 210593,    
at *5 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. (citing In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 316 n.14). 
 15. See infra Section III and accompanying notes. 
 16. See Oscar N. Pinkas & Joseph G. Selby, Is Fisker Automotive Holdings a New 
Limit on Credit-Bidding?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., April 2014, at 14. 
 17. See id. at 85. 
 18. In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, Inc, No. 13–13087(KG), 2014 WL 210593, at *2 
(Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014) (“What collateral is thereby secured remains at issue.”). 
 19. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2012). 
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the claim is subject to a bona fide dispute, limiting a creditor’s ability to 
credit bid is consistent with prior case law.20 
This paper examines In re Fisker in an effort to determine its 
precedential value and its implications for future credit bidding. Part I 
studies the history of credit bidding in order to better understand what is 
encompassed by § 363(k)’s for cause limitation. Part II studies the issues 
presented in Fisker, including a review of the facts leading up to Judge 
Gross’s decision and a discussion of the multiple for cause bases set 
forth in the opinion. Part III surveys the potential impact of Fisker and 
briefly investigates the potential concerns for practitioners going 
forward. The Note concludes that application of Fisker will likely 
remain limited to the facts of the case. 
I. THE HISTORY OF CREDIT BIDDING IN BANKRUPTCY 
In order to properly discuss the direction in which the right to credit 
bid is heading, it is instructive to examine where that right came from. 
Subsection (A) of this Part looks to the historic roots of credit bidding in 
an attempt to examine the loom from which Bankruptcy Code’s credit 
bidding protections were woven. Subsection (B) of this Part discusses 
the evolution of credit bidding after the enactment of the Bankruptcy 
Code and look at how courts have interpreted both § 363(k) and 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A). 
A. CREDIT BIDDING PRIOR TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
With the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Congress did not explicitly 
recognize the right to credit bid.21 However, Section 57(h) the Act—
which provided for the valuation of security interests—stated that the 
value of the collateral “shall be determined by converting the same into 
money according to the terms of the agreement” between the creditor 
																																																																																																																																
 20. See, e.g., In re Octagon Roofing, 123 B.R. 583 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991); Wege, 
et al. supra note 10, at 15-16; RICHARD N. TILTON, PURCHASE AND SALE OF ASSETS IN 
BANKRUPTCY CASES §11.9 (1984) (“Thus, if the collateral is offered at a price 
exceeding the original valuation, the creditor may bid in the full amount of the 
unsecured claim as long as it was properly secured.”) (emphasis added). 
 21. 30 Stat. 554, 560, 55th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1898). 
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and the debtor.22 This section allowed parties to contract for specific 
rights-related bidding procedures and the terms of foreclosure.23 
Soon after Congress recognized the right of parties to contract for 
specific rights, the courts recognized, inter alia, the right to credit bid 
absent a contractual obligation.24 In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. 
Radford,25 the Supreme Court addressed the rights of secured creditors 
in connection with the farm foreclosure provisions of the Frazier-Lemke 
Act of 1934.26 Striking down the Frazier-Lemke Act, the Supreme Court 
held that mortgagees were deprived of the rights traditionally recognized 
under United States law. 27  Absent procedures ensuring fair 
compensation and due process of law, the Court held that this 
deprivation constituted an impermissible taking under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.28 Under the Act, secured creditors were 
deprived of their rights to: 
(1) retain the lien until the indebtedness thereby secured is paid . . . 
(2) realize upon the security by a judicial public sale . . . (3) determine 
when such sale shall be held, subject only to the discretion of the court . 
. . (4) protect its interest in the property by bidding at such sale 
whenever held, and thus to assure having the mortgaged property 
devoted primarily to the satisfaction of the debt, either through receipt of 
the proceeds of a fair competitive sale or by taking the property itself . . . 
(5) control meanwhile the property during the period of default, subject 
																																																																																																																																
 22. Id. Additionally, Section 68(a) of the Act permitted set-offs regarding mutual 
debts. See id. at § 68(a). Credit bidding could be thought of an extension of set-off 
doctrine in that, after the auction, creditor and debtor hold mutual debts—which would 
allow for the application of Section 68(a)—with only the balance remaining to be paid. 
 23. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 57(h), 30 Stat. 554, 560, 55th Cong. (2nd Sess. 
1898) (“by agreement”). 
 24. See generally, Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 
(1935) (acknowledging the right to credit bid in foreclosure sales). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Frazier-Lemke Farm-Mortgage Act (Agricultural Debt Relief Act), ch. 869, 48 
Stat. 1289 (1934) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1934)); see also Charles J. Tabb, 
Credit Bidding, Security, and the Obsolescence of Chapter 11, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 
103, 114 n.67 (2013) (“[The] Act provided appraisal rights to farm debtors, for the 
debtor’s purchase of an encumbered farm at appraised value with mortgagee’s consent, 
or for debtor’s retention of possession for five years with the option to purchase at any 
time at appraised or reappraised value, subject to payment of reasonable rental fixed by 
court.”). 
 27. Radford, 295 U.S. at 869. 
 28. Id.; see also Tabb, supra note 26, at 114 n.69 (recognizing the dual holding of 
Radford in that both the Takings and Due Process clauses of the Fifth Amendment 
would render the Frazier-Lemke Act unconstitutional). 
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only to the discretion of the court, and to have the rents and profits 
collected by a receiver for the satisfaction of the debt.29 
Thus, in Radford, the Supreme Court officially recognized, inter 
alia, the right to credit bid in the context of the sale of distressed 
property. 30  Following the decision in Radford, Congress enacted a 
revised version of the Frazier-Lemke Act 31  that withstood judicial 
scrutiny in Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank.32 One 
distinguishing aspect of the Revised Act—and ultimately the 
determinative factor in upholding the statute—was that the Act’s 
provisions did not deprive a creditor of any one right.33 As enumerated 
in Radford, the Act did not impair rights (1), (2), and (4), and only 
limited a creditor’s ability to exercise rights (3) and (5).34 In Wright, the 
Supreme Court held that this impairment did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment.35 
Congress further amended the Bankruptcy Act in 1938, several 
years after the Radford and Wright decisions; however, Congress chose 
not to codify a creditor’s right to credit bid in these amendments.36 
Instead, Congress relied on the parties’ contractual relationships and 
applicable non-bankruptcy law to dictate the process and procedures of 
auction sales.37 
																																																																																																																																
 29. Radford, 295 U.S. at 594–95 (numerals added). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Act of Aug. 28, 1935, ch. 792, 49 Stat. 942 (amending 11 U.S.C.A. § 203(s) 
(1935)). 
 32. 300 U.S. 440 (1937). 
 33. Id. at 457. The Wright court was also quick to note that the Radford decision 
should be construed as a ‘totality’ test, rather than a bright-line rule that deprivation of 
any one right would render a statute invalid per se. Id. at 457 (“It was not held that the 
deprivation of any one of these rights would have rendered the Act invalid, but that the 
effect of the statute in its entirety was to deprive the mortgagee of his property without 
due process of law.”). 
 34. Id. at 457. 
 35. Id. The Supreme Court’s decision to uphold a statute that curtails a creditor’s 
rights at common law likely provided support to the “for cause” limitation ultimately 
imposed on a creditor’s right to credit bid under § 363(k). See generally, Pub. L. No. 
98-353, § 442(g) (1984) (adding “for cause” limitation to § 363(k)). 
 36. The Chandler Act, § 116(3), 52 Stat. 883. Section 116(3) of the Chandler Act 
permits pre-plan sales in a manner similar to § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code; however, 
this section does not include a provision for credit bidding. Id. 
 37. Id. § 57(h); see also id. § 216(7) (cram down procedures). 
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B. CREDIT BIDDING UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
In 1978, Congress passed a full-scale reform of federal bankruptcy 
law. 38  As part of the comprehensive reform, Congress enacted 
§ 363(k),39 which recognized a secured creditor’s right to credit bid in 
sales outside of a plan of reorganization, and § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), 40 
which provided for credit bidding as a means to cram down a dissenting 
creditor and confirm a Chapter 11 plan.41 
Subsection (i) of this Part illustrates how credit bidding under 
§ 363(k) of the Code works and examines several cases to determine the 
extent to which courts may impair the right to credit bid. Subsection (ii) 
of this Part illustrates the process by which debtors may cram down a 
Chapter 11 plan using § 1129(b)(2)(A) of the code and discusses the 
recent controversy concerning the “indubitable equivalent” prong of that 
section. 
1. The Right to Credit Bid Under § 363(k) 
Section 363(k) was enacted as a mechanism to (1) guarantee that a 
secured creditor’s rights that existed prior to bankruptcy continue 
throughout the process and (2) ensure the proper valuation of property 
disposed of outside the traditional processes of Chapter 7 or Chapter 
11.42 In essence, § 363(k) was enacted to codify the existing right to 
																																																																																																																																
 38. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) 
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq.). 
 39. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (1978) (“At a sale under subsection (b) of this section of 
property that is subject to a lien that secures an allowed claim, if the holder of such 
claim purchases such property, such holder may offset such claim against the purchase 
price of such property.”); Buccola & Keller, supra note 2, at 99 (“Today, some 56 
percent of debtors with any value to speak of essentially sell all of their assets.”). 
 40. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1978) (“subject to section 363(k)”). 
 41. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 363 (permitting debtor to sell property outside a plan of 
reorganization), with 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (permitting debtor to sell property within a plan 
of reorganization). 
 42. See TILTON, supra note 20, § 11.9 (“No prior valuation under § 506(a) would 
limit the bidding right, since the actual bid at sale is determinative of value.”) (citing S. 
Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1978); 124 Cong. Rec. H 11,093 (Sept. 28, 
1978); S. 17409 (Oct. 6 1978)); see also Buccola & Keller, supra note 2, at 103-04 
(arguing that the results of credit bid auctions should mimic the value-maximizing 
results of all-cash transactions); Michael J. Hoffman, Note, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 
L.L.C. v. Amalgamated Bank: Examining the Importance of Credit Bidding at Chapter 
11 Asset Sales, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1223, 1248-49 (2013) (“First, credit bidding preserves 
a lender’s property interest that was acquired long before the debtors even entered 
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credit bid recognized in Radford and Wright.43 Despite Congress’s intent 
to grant creditor the right to credit bid to the extent the practice was 
allowed at common law, the plain language of § 363(k)—as originally 
enacted—did not clearly permit courts to limit a creditor’s right to credit 
bid.44 To remedy this, Congress amended the section in 1984, adding a 
“for cause” limitation to the right to credit bid.45 
Traditionally, courts have been hesitant to limit a creditor’s right to 
credit bid under § 363(k).46 When considering whether to restrict credit 
bidding, courts have discussed several factors, including: (i) notice to 
other parties in interest, especially other secured creditors; (ii) the ability 
of the credit bidder to provide a deposit or other form of protection to 
the estate in case the credit bidder’s lien is subsequently challenged 
successfully; (iii) the adequacy of the purchase price; and (iv) the 
benefit to the debtor’s estate.47 While the use of syndicated loans and 
other joint investment vehicles has raised new credit bidding issues in 
recent years,48 the two traditional areas where courts limit a creditor’s 
																																																																																																																																
bankruptcy. Second, credit bidding brings increased cash value to the bankruptcy estate. 
Finally, credit bidding instills corporate lenders with confidence that they will retain 
their rights during bankruptcy, which opens credit markets and reduces interest rates.”). 
 43. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 363.09 (16th ed.) (“The right of a lienholder 
whose lien was not in bona fide dispute to bid at a sale free and clear of liens was 
generally recognized under prior law, and this right is continued by section 363(k).”) 
(footnote omitted). Outside of bankruptcy, at least 42 states have enacted statutes that 
permit credit bidding. See Jason S. Brookner, Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia 
Newspapers: The Eradication of a Carefully Constructed Statutory Regime Through 
Misinterpretation of Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 85 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 127, 139 n.68 (2011) (citations omitted) (providing citations to cases and statutes 
that authorize credit bidding). 
 44. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (1978). 
 45. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, § 442(g), 98 Stat. 333 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 363(k)) (“Section 363(k) of title 11 
of the United States Code is amended by striking out ‘if the holder’ and inserting in lieu 
thereof ‘unless the court for cause orders otherwise the holder of such claim may bid at 
such sale, and, if the holder.’”). 
 46. See Wege, et al., supra note 10, at 15 (“[T]he court has the ability to prohibit a 
creditor from credit bidding its claims ‘for cause.’ This is a rare occurrence.”). 
 47. John T. Gregg, A Review of Credit Bidding Under 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(k), 2008 
NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 17 (2008). 
 48. See Wege, et al., supra note 10, at 16 (discussing when the liens of other 
secured creditors are in pari passu with the liens of the secured creditor attempting to 
credit bid). For other recent examples of litigation regarding “for cause” issues, see 
Wege, et al., supra note 10, at 16-32 and accompanying notes. 
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ability to credit bid involve either a bona fide dispute to the claim itself 
or collusion in the sale process.49 
In In re Octagon Roofing, the court modified a creditor’s right to 
credit bid its claim after the trustee established a bona fide dispute as to 
the validity of the creditor’s lien.50 Whereas in In re Theroux, the court 
denied the creditor the right to credit bid when the facts indicated the 
creditor would receive a sweetheart deal to the detriment of all other 
creditors. 51  Lastly, in Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re 
SubMicron Systems Corp.), the Third Circuit held that a creditor holding 
a completely deficient secured claim had the right to credit bid the full 
amount of its secured claim.52 
a. In re Octagon Roofing 
In In re Octagon Roofing, the debtor proposed to sell a 
manufacturing facility used to produce roofing material, along with all 
the equipment and inventory on the premises in an action pursuant to 
																																																																																																																																
 49. See, e.g., In re Moritz, 162 B.R. 618, 619 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In re 
Octagon Roofing, 123 B.R. 583, 588 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (requiring the credit-
bidding bank to deliver an irrevocable letter of credit to the trustee to secure the portion 
of the bid based on a mortgage that was the subject of a pending adversary proceeding); 
In re Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc., 81 B.R. 682, 688 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (permitting the 
purchasing bank an offset on an immediate basis but then ordering that the offset will 
be negated should the bank lose at trial on the objection to claim and that the bank will 
be liable for interest from the date of the sale); Bank of Nova Scotia v. St. Croix Hotel 
Corp. (In re St. Croix Hotel Corp.), 44 B.R. 277-79 (D. V.I. 1984) (finding the same); 
In re Theroux, 169 B.R. 498, 499 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1994) (denying trustee’s proposed sale 
of liquor license for price substantially below market value, which would only benefit 
secured party and has specific purpose of wiping out interests of taxing authorities); In 
re Diebart Bancroft, No. 92-3744, 1993 WL 21423, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 1993) 
(upholding sale where no evidence of collusion sufficient to establish lack of good faith 
and selling price was fair); see also Boris I. Mankovetskiy, The Nuts And Bolts Of 
Credit Bidding: A Primer For Traditional Lenders And Distressed Debt Investors, 
METRO. CORP. COUNS., March 2011, at 18 (“If there is a bona fide dispute as to the 
validity, extent or priority of the secured creditor’s lien or the amount of its allowed 
claim, the Bankruptcy Court may condition the creditor’s ability to credit bid on the 
creditor’s agreement to pay the purchase price in cash if the claim is ultimately 
disallowed.”); Brad B. Erens & David A. Hall, Secured Lender Rights in 363 Sales and 
Related Issues of Lender Consent, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 535, 558 (2010). 
 50. 123 B.R. 583 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991). 
 51. 169 B.R. 498 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1994). 
 52. 432 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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§ 363(b).53 Approximately two weeks after the sale motion, a creditor 
holding an uncontested lien on the debtor’s equipment and inventory 
and a disputed second mortgage on the manufacturing facility filed an 
objection to the sale.54 In lieu of determining the validity of the second 
mortgage—which the trustee was challenging as a fraudulent 
conveyance55—the court required the creditor to submit an irrevocable 
letter of credit in the amount of the disputed mortgage, in exchange for 
which the creditor was allowed to credit bid the full amount of its 
disputed and undisputed claims.56 The court based its ruling on the fact 
that the trustee presented credible evidence that placed the creditor’s 
mortgage in dispute and that, absent adequate protection, allowing the 
creditor to credit bid a disputed claim could have injured other parties 
should the creditor eventually fail to prove its claim.57 While the court 
did not bar the creditor from credit bidding its disputed claim, the court 
did require protection proportional to the risk borne by other parties—
i.e. the court impaired the creditor’s ability to credit bid the full value of 
its claim.58 
b. In re Theroux 
In In re Theroux, the debtor and its largest secured creditor co-
sponsored a sale proposal to convey title to its liquor license—valued at 
$20,000 to $30,000—to that creditor for a credit bid in the amount of 
$3,000.59 Both state and local taxing authorities objected to the sale on 
the basis of collusion.60 In denying the proposed sale, the Theroux court 
examined both the adequacy of the purchase price and the statements of 
the parties and ultimately held that the debtor and secured creditor failed 
to show evidence of a legitimate sale.61 
																																																																																																																																
 53. In re Octagon Roofing, 123 B.R. at 584-85. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 585. The second mortgage was provided as part of the debtor’s guarantee 
of a third party debt. Id. at 585-86. The Trustee argued that this conveyance was 
fraudulent because the debtor received less than fair value in return. Id. 
 56. Id. at 588. 
 57. Id. at 592. 
 58. Id. 
 59. In re Theroux, 169 B.R. at 498. The subsequent plan was for the secured 
creditor to sell the license at market value and keep the proceeds. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 499. 
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First, the court relied on statements made by the secured creditor 
who represented that the debtor’s primary purpose for the sale was to 
destroy the interests held by the various taxing authorities in the 
proceeds from a sale of the liquor license.62 Second, the court held that 
this bad faith motive created a presumption of a conflict of interest that 
the parties failed to rebut. 63  Third, the court determined that the 
“blatantly inadequate” sale price was further evidence of collusive 
intent. 64  Despite the court’s disapproval of the actions taken by the 
creditor and trustee, the creditor argued that its right to credit bid up to 
the full amount of its $400,000 claim rendered the proposed sale price 
irrelevant.65 Agreeing with the secured creditor, the court held that this 
situation was precisely the set of facts that allowed the court to proscribe 
credit bidding for cause under § 363(k).66 
c. In re SubMicron Systems Corp. 
In 1997, SubMicron was experiencing cash flow issues and sought 
financing to continue its operations.67 From 1997 to 1999, SubMicron 
secured financing through a revolving credit facility and several 
issuances of high-yield notes—all secured to varying degrees by liens 
encumbering substantially all of SubMicron’s assets.68 The additional 
financing proved unsuccessful as SubMicron continued to sustain 
substantial net losses.69 In July 1999, SubMicron entered negotiations 
with its secured lenders regarding a potential acquisition of the 
company’s assets, and on August 31, 1999, SubMicron entered into an 
asset purchase agreement with a joint venture entity created by the 
company’s secured creditors.70 On September 1, 1999, SubMicron filed 
for Chapter 11 relief and moved to sell its assets pursuant to § 363(b).71 
Of the $55.5 million proposed purchase price, $10.2 million consisted of 
cash earmarked to satisfy various priority claims and $40 million 
																																																																																																																																
 62. Id. at 499 & n.2. 
 63. Id. at 499. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Id. at 499 n.3. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 
448, 452 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 453. 
 71. Id. 
280 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XX 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
consisted of a credit bid on behalf of claims held by the secured 
creditors who formed the acquiring entity.72 The district court approved 
the sale—over the objections of the unsecured creditors’ committee—
and the auction closed on October 15, 1999.73 
The creditors’ committee filed an adversary proceeding following 
the sale arguing, inter alia, that the acquiring entity should not have 
been permitted to credit bid the full value of the secured creditors’ 
claims.74 The district court ruled in favor of the debtor—re-affirming the 
sale—after which, the plan administrator appealed the decision to the 
Third Circuit.75 The main argument against allowing the creditor’s to 
credit bid centered on the district court’s factual finding that—given the 
extent of prior liens—there was no collateral available to secure the 
1999 fundings at the time they were made.76 The plan administrator 
argued that since the security had no actual value at the time of issuance, 
that funding should be treated as unsecured for the purposes of credit 
bidding.77 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit held that the plain language of 
§ 363(k) extended the right to credit bid up to the amount of an “allowed 
claim,” which includes both the secured and deficiency portions of a 
claim under § 506(a).78 Thus, even though the claim based on the 1999 
series of notes could have been entirely a deficiency claim, the plain 
																																																																																																																																
 72. Id. The balance of the bid consisted of assumed liabilities. Id. 
 73. Id. The district court approved the sale following a withdrawal of reference. 
See id.; see generally, 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (outlining the procedure for withdrawal 
of reference). 
 74. In re SubMicron 432 F.3d at 453. The plan administrator was subsequently 
substituted for the creditors’ committee in the proceeding. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 459. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 461. Interestingly, the Third Circuit relies on language of a dissenting 
Supreme Court Justice as authority for defining “allowed claim” in that manner. See id. 
(citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 422 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Despite a 
lack of authority for the Third Circuit’s definition of allowed claim, allowing a secured 
creditor to credit bid up to the full value of the claim makes intuitive sense because the 
§ 363 auction provides a market-test for the value of the claim where a secured creditor 
would not benefit from credit bidding higher than the true value of the collateral. See id. 
at 460 (“Naturally, Lender will not outbid Bidder unless Lender believes it could 
generate a greater return [owning the asset] than the return for Lender represented by 
Bidder’s offer.”). 
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language of § 363(k) still permitted the secured creditor to credit bid its 
full value.79 
2. The Right to Credit Bid Under § 1129(b)(2)(A) 
Section 1129(b)(2)(A) permits a plan to be confirmed over the 
objection of an impaired secured creditor if the plan: (i) provides the 
creditor with payments totaling the value of the allowed claim and 
allows the creditor to retain its lien securing claim, (ii) provides for the 
sale of the collateral with the creditor able to credit bid its claim, or (iii) 
provides the creditor with the indubitable equivalent of its claim.80 
Several recent decisions have addressed whether a creditor has any 
right to credit bid under § 1129(b)(2)(A). 81  In In re Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc.82 and In re Pacific Lumber, Inc.,83 the Third and Fifth 
Circuits discussed whether a debtor could circumvent the requirement of 
credit bidding under § 363(k) in sales under a plan of reorganization.84 
Addressing the issues raised by Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia 
Newspapers, the Supreme Court, in RadLAX Gateway Hotel v. 
Amalgamated Bank, held that the ability to credit bid was clearly and 
unambiguously intended to apply to asset sales within the cram down 
context.85 
a. In re Pacific Lumber, Co. and In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC 
In In re Pacific Lumber, Co., the debtor sought to sell 200,000 
acres of redwood timberland encumbered by a lien securing $740 
million in notes.86 Under the proposed plan, the proceeds of the sale, 
nearly $513.6 million in cash, would be distributed to the note holders in 
																																																																																																																																
 79. Id. Intuitively, this also makes sense because allowing the credit bid eliminates 
any payout a creditor might be entitled to should it chose not to credit bid and accept a 
distribution on its claim. See Buccola & Keller, supra note 2, at 102-103. The decrease 
in total claim value benefits both the estate and unsecured creditors. Id. 
 80. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 81. Cf. Buccola & Keller, supra note 2, at 100 (“Until very recently, the value 
inherent in credit bidding was not in jeopardy, as bankruptcy courts had virtually no 
authority to enjoin the practice.”). 
 82. 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 83. 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 84. Buccola & Keller, supra note 2, at 101. 
 85. 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012). 
 86. 584 F.3d 229, 236 (5th Cir. 2009). 
282 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XX 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
satisfaction of its allowed claim. 87  Despite a judicial determination 
following “extensive valuation testimony” that the timberland was worth 
“not more than $510 million,” the secured creditor voted to reject the 
plan.88 
In In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, the debtor proposed to sell 
substantially all of its assets for only $66.5 million—$37 million in cash 
and real property valued at $29.5 million—free and clear of a secured 
creditor’s claim valued at nearly $318 million.89 The secured creditor 
objected to the auction procedures proposed by the debtor, an issue 
which was ultimately appealed to the Third Circuit.90 
The debtors in both Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers 
attempted to confirm a Chapter 11 plan over the objection of an 
impaired secured creditor under § 1129(b)(2)(A) without providing the 
secured creditor with the right to credit bid at the sale of property.91 Both 
the Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit’s held that the language of 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) unambiguously allowed debtors to conduct an asset sale 
under subsection (iii) as long as the court made a judicial determination 
that the resulting sale or auction provided the secured creditor with the 
indubitable equivalent of its total claim.92 In essence, both courts held 
that the specific language referring to asset sales in subsection (ii) does 
not control whether a debtor must proceed under the requirements of 
that subsection—i.e. each subsection of § 1129(b)(2)(A) has 
independent legal significance under which a debtor may cram down a 
Chapter 11 plan on an impaired secured creditor.93 
																																																																																																																																
 87. Id. at 239. Note holders would also receive any payments that result from a lien 
on the proceeds from an unrelated litigation along with any payments on its deficiency 
claim that come available after the sale. Id. 
 88. Id. at 238. The Fifth Circuit indicated that the secured creditor rejected the plan 
on the basis that it deprives the creditor of “the possibility of later increases in the 
collateral’s value.” Id. at 247. However, this case takes place during the recession of 
2008 and the creditor likely wanted to delay the sale of the lands until after real estate 
market conditions improved. 
 89. 599 F.3d 298, 301-02 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 90. Id. at 302-303. 
 91. See id. at 312-313; In re Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d at 245-46. 
 92. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 312-313; In re Pacific Lumber, 
584 F.3d at 245-46. 
 93. See, e.g., In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 312-313; In re Pacific 
Lumber, 584 F.3d at 245-46. 
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b. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank 
In 2007, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC and its affiliate purchased a 
hotel and adjacent lot near Los Angeles International Airport.94 RadLAX 
planned to renovate the hotel and build a parking structure on the 
adjacent lot.95 In order to fund the initial purchase price and construction 
costs, RadLAX entered into a $142 million dollar loan secured by a 
blanket lien on all of RadLAX’s assets. 96  Faced with unexpected 
construction costs and limited ability to generate further liquidity, 
RadLAX filed for Chapter 11 protection in the fall of 2009.97 
Under RadLAX’s proposed Chapter 11 plan, its assets were to be 
sold at auction prior to dissolution of the company. 98  The bidding 
procedures provided for an all-cash “stalking horse” bid in the region of 
$55 million, and also required that all other bids be in cash as well.99 
The secured creditor objected to the bidding procedures—which denied 
the right to credit bid any amount of its approximately $120 million 
claim—and RadLAX sought to confirm the plan over that objection 
under §1129(b)(2)(A). 100  The bankruptcy court denied the sale on 
ground that the asset sale did not comply with any subsection of 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A).101 The debtor appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which 
affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of the sale.102 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in RadLAX in 
order to resolve the circuit split concerning whether the subsection (iii) 
“indubitable equivalent” test could apply to asset sales.103 Focusing on 
the plain meaning of the statute and availing itself of the general/specific 
canon, the Supreme Court held that an asset sale under a Chapter 11 
plan must proceed under subsection (ii) governing asset sales.104 Cram 
down under subsection (ii) requires a debtor to permit a secured creditor 
																																																																																																																																
 94. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, L.L.C. v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2068 
(2012). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 2068-69. In fact, by August 2009, Debtors still owed over $120 million of 
the $142 million loan, with over $1 million in interest accruing each month. Id. 
 98. Id. at 2069. 
 99. Id. at 2069 & n.1. 
 100. Id. at 2069. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 2069-70. 
 104. Id. at 2071-72. 
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to credit bid.105 Thus, the Supreme Court’s holding in RadLAX supports 
a creditor’s right to credit bid—subject to the aforementioned limitations 
of § 363(k)—in cases where a debtor wishes to sell the creditor’s 
collateral without that party’s consent.106 
While the RadLAX decision does not affect pre-plan asset sales, 
which proceed under § 363, its holding reinforces the importance of a 
creditor’s right to credit bid to preserve the value of its claim.107 
II. DISASSEMBLING IN RE FISKER AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS, INC. 
Looking at cases under § 363(k), courts have overwhelmingly 
supported the exercise of the right to credit bid absent particular facts 
that doing so would be collusive or contrary to the interests of all 
creditors.108 In response to a line of cases that substantively impaired a 
creditor’s right to credit bid its claim, the RadLAX decision sought to 
restore the presumptive right that Congress provided.109 In contrast, the 
language in In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc. limiting a creditor’s 
right to credit bid on the basis that credit bidding will “freeze” the 
bidding contravenes both lines of cases;110 however, it is unclear what 
precedential weight will be given to Fisker going forward.111 
																																																																																																																																
 105. Id. at 2072. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 2070 n.2 (“The ability to credit-bid helps to protect a creditor against the 
risk that its collateral will be sold at a depressed price. It enables the creditor to 
purchase the collateral for what it considers the fair market price (up to the amount of 
its security interest) without committing additional cash to protect the loan. That right is 
particularly important for the Federal Government, which is frequently a secured 
creditor in bankruptcy and which often lacks appropriations authority to throw good 
money after bad in a cash-only bankruptcy auction.”); see also Wright v. Vinton Branch 
of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937). 
 108. See supra Section I.B. 
 109. RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. at 2073 (“[N]othing in the generalized statutory purpose of 
protecting secured creditors can overcome the specific manner of that protection which 
the text of § 1129(b)(2)(A) contains.”); see also id. (“[T]he pros and cons of credit-
bidding are for the consideration of Congress, not the courts.”); In re Philadelphia 
Newspapers, L.L.C., 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pacific Lumber, Co., 584 F.3d 
229 (5th Cir. 2009); Hoffman, supra note 42, at 1245 (“[Section] 363(k) establishes an 
unambiguous foundation on which secured creditors can base their presumptive right to 
credit bid.”). 
 110. 2014 WL 210593, at *6 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014); supra Section I.B. 
 111. See Pinkas & Selby, supra note 16, at 84. 
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A. THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
Fisker Automotive (“Fisker”) was founded in 2007 as a 
manufacturer of high-end electric cars.112 In an effort to subsidize the 
production of energy-efficient vehicles, the United States Department of 
Energy (the “DOE”) provided Fisker with initial funding of $169 
million, with an additional $360 million available should certain 
benchmarks be met.113 Stemming from a series of unfortunate events—
including safety recalls related to third party parts and the destruction of 
inventory in Hurricane Sandy—the DOE declined to extend financing 
past its initial outlay of $169 million.114 In early 2013, Fisker began 
exploring its available options regarding a sale of the company.115 On 
October 11, 2013, the DOE sold its $168.5 million claim against Fisker 
for $25 million to Hybrid Tech Holdings (“Hybrid”)—a potential 
strategic acquirer of Fisker’s assets.116 After initial discussions between 
Fisker and Hybrid regarding an asset sale, Fisker filed for bankruptcy on 
November 22, 2013.117 
Hybrid and Fisker entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement under 
which Hybrid would acquire substantially all of Fisker’s assets in 
exchange for a $75 million credit bid through a private sale. 118  In 
support of its proposed sale, Fisker represented that “the cost and delay 
arising from a competitive auction process or pursuing a potential 
transaction with an entity other than Hybrid would be reasonably 
unlikely to increase value for the estates.” 119  Despite Hybrid’s 
uncontested status as successor to the DOE claim, the extent to which 
the DOE’s security interest was properly perfected remained at issue at 
the time of the proposed sale.120 The unsecured creditors’ committee (the 
“Committee”) opposed the sale to Hybrid, favoring an auction between 
Hybrid and Wanxiang America Corporation (“Wanxiang”).121 
																																																																																																																																
 112. In re Fisker, 2014 WL 210593, at *1. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Pinkas & Selby, supra note 16, at 14. 
 116. In re Fisker, 2014 WL 210593, at *2. 
 117. Id. at *1-2. For a detailed history regarding the Fisker transaction, see Pinkas & 
Selby, supra note 16, at 14. 
 118. In re Fisker, 2014 WL 210593, at *2. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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Prior to the hearing on January 10, 2014, Fisker and the Committee 
stipulated to a number of facts, including that: (1) if Hybrid’s right to 
credit bid was either denied or capped at $25 million122 then there would 
be “a strong likelihood” of an auction that would create “material value 
for the estate” above and beyond the proposed $75 million private sale 
and (2) if Hybrid’s right to credit bid was not limited, then Wanxiang 
would not bid more than Hybrid’s asserted secured claims. 123 
Additionally, the parties limited the scope of the Committee’s objection 
to the sale to four grounds, including that: 
(i) credit bidding should not be permitted here given that a material 
portion of the assets to be sold in their entirety are not subject to a 
property perfected lien in favor of Hybrid or are subject to lien in 
favor of Hybrid which is in bona fide dispute, which dispute cannot 
be quickly and easily resolved[;] 
(ii) “cause” exists because limiting the credit bid will facilitate an 
open and fully competitive cash auction[;] or 
(iii) “cause” exists because the Debtors’ assets to be sold in their 
entirety include encumbered, unencumbered and disputed assets.124 
These stipulations set the stage from which Judge Gross bases his 
decision.125 
B. THE MODIFICATION OF BIDDING PROCEDURES AND ITS AFTERMATH 
First, Judge Gross quickly disregarded the first ground on the basis 
that Hybrid—a bona fide purchaser—must be allowed to bid an amount 
equal to the amount it paid for its claim.126 While, Judge Gross stated 
that the only issue remaining is whether “cause” exists to limit Hybrid’s 
right to credit bid to only $25 million,127 he revisited the perfected lien 
																																																																																																																																
 122. $25 million represents the amount Hybrid purchased its claim for—i.e. the 
amount of money already invested in purchasing Fisker. Id. 
 123. Id. at *2-3. 
 124. Id. at *3. 
 125. Id. at *4 (“The Stipulated Agreements are highly significant to the credit 
bidding issue.”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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issue to determine whether that could constitute “cause” to limit credit 
bidding.128 
Next, Judge Gross cites to Philadelphia Newspapers for the 
proposition that a creditor’s right to credit bid can be limited to “foster a 
competitive bidding environment.”129 Applying this logic to the facts of 
the case, Judge Gross noted that a failure to limit Hybrid’s credit bid 
would extinguish any potential bidding.130 It is upon this theory that 
Judge Gross explicitly limits Hybrid’s right to credit bid.131 
Although Judge Gross already determined that the court should 
limit Hybrid’s credit bid, he went on to admonish Fisker for its 
expedited sale process—Fisker filed for bankruptcy three days prior to 
Thanksgiving and insisted on a confirmation hearing two days after the 
New Year.132 In particular, Judge Gross took umbrage with fact that a 
non-operating debtor sought to rush through a § 363 sale without a 
satisfactory reason as to why time was of the essence.133 
Lastly, Judge Gross revisited the dispute regarding the secured 
status of Hybrid’s claims.134 Distinguishing SubMicron—a case where 
the full value of the creditors’ claim was deemed allowed—on the 
grounds that the extent to which Hybrid’s claim would be allowed had 
not yet been determined, Judge Gross held that the dispute over whether 
Hybrid’s claim was allowable also weighed against permitting a higher 
credit bid.135 
																																																																																																																																
 128. Id. at *5. 
 129. Id. at *4 (citing In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 316 n.14 
(3d Cir. 2010)). 
 130. Id. at *5. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. Traditionally, pre-plan sales were only permitted for “perishable goods.” In 
re Pedlow, 209 F. 841, 842 (2d Cir. 1913); Hill v. Douglass, 78 F.2d 851, 853-54 (9th 
Cir. 1935) (approving the sale of road-making equipment of a contractor to prevent its 
repossession). In recent cases, courts have relaxed their interpretation of § 363(b) to 
allow pre-plan sales where the benefits of the sale are justified. In re Lionel Corp., 722 
F.2d 1063, 1070 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[T]here must be some articulated business 
justification, other than appeasement of major creditors, for using, selling or leasing 
property out of the ordinary course of business before the bankruptcy judge may order 
such disposition under section 363(b).”). 
 134. In re Fisker, 2014 WL 210593, at *5. 
 135. Id. (“The law leaves no doubt that the holder of a lien the validity of which has 
not been determined, as here, may not bid its lien.”) (citing In re Danfuskie Isl. Props., 
LLC 441 B.R. 60 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2010)). 
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In his conclusion, Judge Gross limited Hybrid’s right to credit bid 
to $25 million because a failure to do so would “freeze bidding.”136 He 
also noted that Fisker insisted on an “unfair process”—a process that 
included an expedited sale while the validity of the lien was still in 
dispute.137 
On February 18, 2014, Judge Gross approved the sale of Fisker’s 
assets to Wanxiang for approximately $149.2 million. 138  Wanxiang 
outbid Hybrid in an auction that lasted nineteen rounds.139 At the hearing 
to confirm the Wanxiang sale, Judge Gross stated that “[t]he outcome of 
last week’s auction ‘shows that a fair process is a good thing.’”140 
III. WHAT THE IMPLICATIONS OF FISKER MEAN FOR THE FUTURE OF 
CREDIT BIDDING AND HOW MUCH WEIGHT THE OPINION SHOULD BE 
GIVEN GOING FORWARD 
While Fisker’s holding does not explicitly contravene any relevant 
authority, it cuts against the traditional line of cases which suggest that 
“for cause” limitations on the right to credit bid exist on in exceptional 
circumstances.141 The Fisker decision is especially troubling in the wake 
of the Supreme Court’s RadLAX opinion, which sought to protect the 
right to credit bid. In its aftermath, practitioners are unsure what the true 
takeaway of Fisker is—whether the decision creates additional bases for 
limiting a credit bid or whether the unique facts of this case make it 
distinguishable from traditional for cause cases.142  Additionally, it is 
																																																																																																																																
 136. Id. at * 6. 
 137. Id. Judge Gross’s observations about the sale process could indicate a suspicion 
of collusion between the Debtor and Hybrid. Id. Hybrid attempted twice to appeal the 
decision to limit its right to credit bid to no avail. See Stephanie M. Acreee, Bankruptcy 
Court’s Decision to Limit Credit Bid to $25 Million Not an Appealable Order, BANKR. 
L. REP. (BNA), Feb. 20, 2014, at 1. 
 138. Dawn McCarthy, Fisker Wins Approval for Sale of Assets to China’s Wanxiang 
Group, BANKR. L. REP. (BNA), Feb. 18, 2014, at 1. The Wanxiang bid included 
“$126.2 million in cash, plus equity and $8 million in assumed liabilities.” Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See supra, Section I.B.1. 
 142. See Pinkas & Selby, supra note 16, at 14 (“[I]ts import and holdings might be 
more nuanced than the opinion sets out explicitly.”); STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN 
LLP, CREDIT BIDDING IN THE WAKE OF FISKER AUTOMOTIVE 1 (Jan. 30, 2014); see also 
Joshua Gadharf, May Secured Claim Purchaser Credit Bid the Full Face Value of Its 
Claim at a Bankruptcy Sale? Delaware Bankruptcy Court Says “Not So Fast”, 
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unclear whether the frozen bidding was the determining factor or 
whether it was an amalgam of equally important factors. 
First, Judge Gross indicated that the “for cause” basis to limit 
Hybrid’s credit bid was that a failure to do so would eliminate all other 
bidders.143 Second, at the hearing itself, Judge Gross emphasized the fact 
that the perfection of the liens was still in dispute.144 A third reason to 
limit credit bidding—although not expressly addressed in Fisker—may 
have been concerns of collusion between Fisker and Hybrid.145 While 
the last two reasons are not inconsistent with other cases, finding cause 
when credit bidding would otherwise chill bidding has little to no 
authority to support it.146 Broadly construed, this holding permits courts 
to cap credit bidding when it appears that the specter of a higher credit 
bid will scare away a potential bidder.147 Regardless of the reason, Judge 
Gross’s language concerning the chilling effects of credit bidding will 
undoubtedly lead to more creditors challenging asset sales and more 
																																																																																																																																
MCDONALD HOPKINS BUS. ADVOCATE BLOG: BUS. RESTRUCTURING, (Jan 30, 2014 
10:48:00 AM), https://businessadvocate.mcdonaldhopkins.com. 
 143. In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, Inc, 2014 WL 210593, at *5 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 
17, 2014); see also In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 316 n.14 (3d 
Cir. 2010); Pinkas & Selby, supra note 16. 
 144. See Pinkas & Selby, supra note 16, at 85 (“Reading the opinion and hearing 
transcript together, one can argue that the failure to establish the validity and extent of 
Hybrid Tech’s liens constituted an independent basis to limit or refuse to permit a 
credit-bid.”); see generally Mankovetskiy, supra note 49, at 18 (“Only a creditor 
holding an allowed claim secured by a valid, perfected lien can credit bid for its 
collateral.”). 
 145. As early as April 2013, Fisker had contemplated an asset sale involving 
Wanxiang; however, that deal fell through when an affiliate of Hybrid and shareholder 
of Fisker reconsidered its offer of post-petition financing. Pinkas & Selby, supra note 
16, at 14. Six months later, Hybrid has purchased the DOE claim at less than fifteen 
cents on the dollar and agreed to a purchase agreement with Fisker. Pinkas & Selby, 
supra note 16, at 14. Not only that, but the sale is expedited during the holiday season 
in an attempt to force it through. In re Fisker, 2014 WL 210593, at *5. While the facts 
were clearly insufficient to show actual collusion, Judge Gross may have considered 
this as further evidence warranting a limit on Hybrid’s credit bid. See id. (“[t]he Fisker 
failure has damaged too many people, companies and taxpayers to permit Hybrid to 
short-circuit the bankruptcy process.”). 
 146. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 315-16 (listing cases that 
illustrate the “for cause” limitation). 
 147. See Pinkas & Selby, supra note 16, at 84. Cf. Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, 
LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 459-61 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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parties seeking to cap credit bids in the name of “competitive 
bidding.”148 
However, at the sale hearing Judge Gross expressed doubts as to 
whether this opinion should be applicable beyond the facts of the 
case. 149  In fact, Judge Gross stated, “[t]he Third Circuit has this 
procedure for issuing nonprecedential opinions. And those apply just to 
the parties and are not to be precedent. And I think that’s the case 
here.”150 Yet, Judge Gross failed to expressly convey this sentiment in 
the Fisker opinion itself.151 Some practitioners have argued that the fact 
the opinion is currently unpublished also limits its precedential value.152 
Given the fact that this case was highly fact specific—including the 
lengthy stipulation of facts and that bidding would be non-existent 
should a higher credit bid be permitted—it would not be surprising if the 
Fisker opinion is distinguished by courts in future cases.153 
CONCLUSION 
On its face, the Fisker decision purports to limit credit bidding in 
an effort to promote an active auction process. While this may be true, a 
closer reading of the case shows several other causes for concern that 
may have independent legal significance. Even more nebulous is the 
potential impact this decision will have on the distressed debt market.154 
																																																																																																																																
 148. See Pinkas & Selby, supra note 16, at 85. 
 149. See id. at 84. 
 150. See id. (citing to the sale hearing transcript). 
 151. See In re Fisker, 2014 WL 210593; see also Pinkas & Selby, supra note 16,    
at 84. 
 152. See Pinkas & Selby, supra note 16, at 84. 
 153. Id. 
 154. STROOCK, supra note 142, at 3; see also Mankovetskiy, supra note 49, at 18 
(“Today, credit bidding has evolved into a formidable offensive weapon available to 
private equity, hedge funds and other investors in distressed debt who frequently are 
able to acquire secured debt from existing creditors at a discount and then credit bid the 
full amount of that debt to acquire the collateral.”); Sam Roberge, Maneuvering in the 
Shadows of the Bankruptcy Code: How to Invest In or Take Over Bankrupt Companies 
Within the Limits of the Bankruptcy Code, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 73, 74 (2013) 
(“Claims trading is a $41 billion dollar per year industry. By way of comparison, the 
claims trading industry is larger than the market capitalizations of approximately 80% 
of all S&P 500 companies.”); Jared A. Wilkerson, Defending the Current State of 
Section 363 Sales, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 591, 604 n.63 (2012) (“For example, it is 
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Informational asymmetries and recovery risk already depress the prices 
of distressed debt.155 Now, a purchaser must also worry whether he will 
be limited in his ability to credit bid.156 The inability to credit bid up to 
the full value of a claim may be the difference between controlling the 
assets in demand and waiting in line to collect through distributions in 
bankruptcy—a non-starter for corporations seeking control instead of a 
meager return of capital.157 
Ultimately, Fisker’s main proposition—that a court may limit 
credit bidding to stimulate the bidding process—is likely distinguishable 
by the unique facts of the case.158 But, until courts distance themselves 
from the Fisker holding, secured creditors and claims purchasers will 
have a headache dealing with motions to cap bidding in the interest of 
promoting fairness.159 
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